“The Jive was created by Ben Arent, a college student, over a six-month period as part of his product design degree. The concept was designed to get elderly technophobes connected to their friends and family without feeling overwhelmed of learning how to use social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, etc. It would essentially be their own type of social networking.”
[link to Crave which includes a video demonstration]
This short article nicely talks about a well known pattern of age-related cognition (that with age comes “wisdom” or knowledge). The challenge in Human Factors is using this information in design.
“These findings are all very consistent with the context we’re building for what wisdom is,” she said. “If older people are taking in more information from a situation, and they’re then able to combine it with their comparatively greater store of general knowledge, they’re going to have a nice advantage.”
A U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled the Treasury Department is discriminating against the blind by printing money that is all the same size, with no tactile features that would make it possible to distinguish, say, a $10 bill from a $20. The decision could force the Treasury Department to redesign U.S. bills.
I’ve heard a great deal about trust and automation over the years, but this has to be my favorite new example of over-reliance on a system.
GPS routed bus under bridge, company says
“The driver of the bus carrying the Garfield High School girls softball team that hit a brick and concrete footbridge was using a GPS navigation system that routed the tall bus under the 9-foot bridge, the charter company’s president said Thursday.Steve Abegg, president of Journey Lines in Lynnwood, said the off-the-shelf navigation unit had settings for car, motorcycle, bus or truck. Although the unit was set for a bus, it chose a route through the Washington Park Arboretum that did not provide enough clearance for the nearly 12-foot-high vehicle, Abegg said. The driver told police he did not see the flashing lights or yellow sign posting the bridge height.
“We haven’t really had serious problems with anything, but here it’s presented a problem that we didn’t consider,” Abegg said of the GPS unit. “We just thought it would be a safe route because, why else would they have a selection for a bus?””
Indeed, why WOULD “they” have a selection for a bus? Here is an excerpt from the manual (Disclosure: I am assuming it’s the same model):
“Calculate Routes for – Lets you take full advantage of the routing information built in the City Navigator maps. Some roads have vehicle-based restrictions. For example, a street or gate may be accessible by emergency vehicles only, or a residential street may not allow commercial trucking traffic. By specifying which vehicle type you are driving, you can avoid being routed through an area that is prohibited for your type of vehicle. Likewise, the ******** III may give you access to roads or turns that wouldn’t be available to normal traffic. The following options are available:
Truck (large semi-tractor/trailer
Emergency (ambulance, fire department, police, etc.)
Delivery (delivery vehicles)
Bicycle (avoids routing through interstates and major highways)
If we can assume no automation can be 100% reliable, at what point to people put too much trust in the system? At what point do they ignore the system in favor of more difficult methods, such as a paper map?At what point is a system so misleading that it should not be offered at all? Sanchez (2006) addressed this question and related type and timing of error to amount of trust placed in the automation. Trust declined sharply (for a time) after an error, so we may assume the Seattle driver might have re-checked the route manually had other (less catastrophic) errors occurred in the past.*
The spokesman for the GPS company is quoted in the above article as stating:
“Stoplights aren’t in our databases, either, but you’re still expected to stop for stoplights.”
I didn’t read the whole manual, but I’m pretty sure it doesn’t say the GPS would warn you of stoplights, a closer analogy to the actual feature that contributed to the accident. This is a time where an apology and a promise of re-design might serve the company better than blaming their users.
*Not a good strategy for preventing accidents!
Other sources for information on trust and reliability of automated systems:
Carmaker Nissan Motor is using a specialized driver’s suit and goggles to simulate the bad balance, stiff joints, weaker eyesight and extra five kilograms (11lbs) that may accompany senior citizenry.
Associate chief designer Etsuhiro Watanabe says the suit’s weight and constriction help in determining functionality and accessibility within cars by putting young designers not only in the minds of the mobility-challenged, but also in their bodies.
The new Nissan GT-R is a sports car that’s about to be released in the United States. The car has been a popular model in the Playstation game Grand Turismo. Apparently, the car’s striking information displays (the real car, not the game car) were designed by the creators of the Grand Turismo series (Polyphony Digital/Sony Computer Entertainment). Certainly fancy, but usable?
I was reading a lengthy Q&A with Newt Gingrich in Freakonomics this morning, and came across the following:
Q: You discuss a united American front in your book. What healthcare platforms do you think Americans will unite around?
A: “… This system will have three characteristics, none of which are present in today’s system…. It will make use of information technology. Paper kills. It’s just that simple. With as many as 98,000 Americans dying as a result of medical errors in hospitals every year, ridding the system of paper-based records and quickly adopting health information technology would save lives and save money. We must also move toward e-prescribing to drastically reduce prescription errors.
Newt Gingrich is a powerful man. I am glad he is comfortable with and encouraging of technology. Me too! However, I am terrified of the assumption that information technology systems are inherently better or less error prone than paper systems. “Paper kills” is a nice, tight tag line that people are bound to remember. Is it true?
My earlier post on Paper Protocols saving lives and dollars in Michigan says otherwise. So does research in the context of medical adherence. Linda Liu and Denise Park (2004) identified a paper system as one of the most effective tested when it comes to diabetics remembering to measure their glucose.
It is not the material of the system, it is the design of the system that makes it either intuitive, fail-safe, or error prone. Blindly replacing known paper protocols and records with electronic alternatives is not a guaranteed improvement. This is the kind of thinking that brought us the touchscreen voting system.*
“Oh, it wouldn’t be blind,” one might say. I hope so, but a blanket statement such as “paper kills” doesn’t give me confidence. Paper doesn’t kill, bad design does.
3. How to best design for each. Paper isn’t going away, folks.
*The linked article mentions reliability and security without mentioning usability. I don’t want to go too far afield, so I will save my post on being unable to vote on the Georgia Flag (thanks to the compression artifacts present in the pictures, making it impossible to tell them apart.)
Liu, L. L., & Park, D. C. (2004). Aging and Medical Adherence: The Use of Automatic Processes to Achieve Effortful Things. Psychology and Aging, 19(2), 318-325.
U.S. news agencies are reporting on the California ballots that ‘may have lost Obama the California primary.’ The argument is that he would have pulled in the ‘declined to state’ voters (those who have not registered as either Democrat or Republican), but that because of a human factors error with the ballot, those votes may not have been counted. (The inference is that these voters would have supported Obama.)
Succinctly, declined-to-state voters have to ask for a Democratic ballot. Then they must fill in a bubble at the top of the ballot, saying that they wanted to vote in the Democratic primary. Obviously, many users might not do this, as it seems a redudant code… the ballot they are holding is the Democratic ballot, so why indicate again that it was the ballot they requested? If you look at the ballot below, it says at the top to “select party in the box below.” Of course, there is only one option, which makes it not much of a selection.
It’s likely this area of the ballot was inserted to produce some interesting statistical information (rather than a pure answer of who received the most votes.) If only declined-to-state voters filled the bubble, you could get a count of how many of those voters came out to vote compared to other years, how many chose to vote Democrat, and which candidate received most of their support. While interesting (I would like to know all of those things) it complicates the purpose of primary voting: to count the number of Americans who support a particular candidate.
Why I am not a conspiracy theorist: People with the best of intentions make critical human factors design errors, even errors that cost people their lives (see “Set Phasers on Stun.”) Sometimes, these errors are created by specific good intentions, as in the Florida hanging-chad fiasco.
The reason the choices were staggard on each side of the ballot was to increase the font size, supposedly making the ballot more clear for older voters. This perceptual aid was trumped by the resulting cognitive confusions. These ballot designs may suffer from a lack of user testing, but not from an intentional ploy to keep declined-to-state voters from being counted or to get Pat Buchanan more votes.
Thus, let’s tackle the problem rather than using ‘double bubble’ for a slow news day. Why don’t we demand all ballots and voting machines be user tested? (Security is another issue, for another blog.) If you have an idea of what action to take, please comment so a future post may provide detailed instructions.
NPR ran a story earlier this week on an intriguing new human factors problem: fire-safe elevators.
The fall of the World Trade Center made it painfully obvious that stairs in skyscrapers do not function adequately in emergencies. We’ve always been warned away from elevators in case of fire, and I would go so far as to say it part of our collective knowledge from a young age. With the advent of elevators you should use in a fire comes a host of difficulties.
1. Training the zeitgeist: Not all elevators will be replaced, though new tall buildings will all have fireproof elevators. There may be new rules requiring older buildings over a certain size retrofit at least one elevator as fire safe.
This still makes fireproof elevators the exception instead of the rule. A great research question would be how to train people for a small-percentage case? You want the public, of all ages and experience levels, to know “In case of fire, use stairs, unless there is a fireproof elevator around, which you may or may not have noticed while you were in the building.”
2. Warnings and Information: The symbol in this post is probably familiar to all of you. I’ve occasionally seen it in Spanish, but not often. How will we indicate the difference between fire-safe elevators and other elevators?
Decals, signs and other indicators will not only have to indicate which elevators are safe and their purpose, but whether other elevators in the building are safe or unsafe. My building is square, with elevators on mirrored sides. If one were safe and the other not, I am sure I could remember which was safe, especially under the cognitive demands of an emergency.
3. Wayfinding and luck: Use of the elevator may depend on the location of the fire.
One of the original problems was that elevators opened onto smoke-filled or fire-filled floors. The story did not specify how the new elevators would avoid this. If there is a sensor that prevents them from opening onto such a floor, what if there are people desperately waiting for the elevator on that floor (as they have been re-trained to do)?
Should the system be even more complex, with people gathering on certain floors to await the elevator rescue? And then, if those floors are on fire..
In short, researchers start your engines! We have some training, warning, design, and way-finding work to do.